The Oslo Land Mine Treaty and an Analysis of the United States Decision Not to Sign by Sharnetzka, Craig S.
Penn State International Law Review
Volume 16
Number 3 Dickinson Journal of International Law Article 7
5-1-1998
The Oslo Land Mine Treaty and an Analysis of the
United States Decision Not to Sign
Craig S. Sharnetzka
Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Penn State International
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sharnetzka, Craig S. (1998) "The Oslo Land Mine Treaty and an Analysis of the United States Decision Not to Sign," Penn State
International Law Review: Vol. 16: No. 3, Article 7.
Available at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr/vol16/iss3/7
The Oslo Land Mine Treaty and an
Analysis of the United States Decision
Not to Sign
I. Introduction
For almost all Americans, the threat of injury from an anti-
personnel land mine must seem remote. Americans do not fear
that they will detonate a mine and blow off a limb when they walk
down the street of a city or town in the United States. However,
for Marianne Holtz, a former public nurse from Boise, Idaho, the
land mine problem is very real.' Holtz has worked in refugee
camps in Somalia, Sudan, Ruwanda and Zaire.2 It was in Zaire on
a road that was supposed to be safe where a jeep Holtz was
traveling in struck a land mine.3 Holtz lost both legs above the
knee.4 After seven surgeries, Holtz can now walk with a prosthesis
for a short period, but is mostly relegated to her wheelchair.5
Now, Holtz can no longer function as a nurse, and at fifty-eight
years old has dedicated her life to educating the public about the
horrors of land mines.6 For this Boise, Idaho woman, the horror
is very real.
This Comment focuses on the startling land mine problem that
confronts the worldwide community and the very recent legislative
1. See Tim Woodward, Boisean Knows the Horrors Wrought by Land Mines,
IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 2, 1997, at lb.
2. Id. Holtz worked for years in the United States at St. Luke's Regional
Medical Center and other places, but felt called to help the refugees displaced by
war around the world. Id.
3. Id. Holtz had been asked to take a job in Bosnia but decided to work in
Zaire because it was supposed to be much safer in Zaire. Id.
4. Woodward, supra note 1. Holtz has no recollection of the accident and
only remembers waking for four days later in the hospital. She remembers having
her jaw wired shut and tubes running in and out of her. Although she tried at this
point Holtz could not find her feet. Id.
5. Id. Holtz has had seven surgeries performed as well as significant facial
surgical repairs. Id.
6. See id. (finding that Holtz writes letters and articles, and, although it is not
easy for her to travel, has spoken at many international gatherings and in places
as far as the former Soviet Republic of Turkmenistan. She also spoke in
December in Ottawa as over one-hundred nations gathered there to sign a treaty
that banned, 1997, all anti-personnel land mines.)
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attempts that have been made to deal with this problem. Specifi-
cally, in Oslo, Norway on September 17, 1997, a treaty was drafted
and agreed upon by close to 100 nations.7 This treaty, entitled the
"Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction"
is the first international treaty to establish an outright ban on land
mines.'
Part I of this Comment will examine, with the use of statistics,
the horrors wrought by land mine deployment worldwide. In
addition, this Part will show the general patterns of injuries caused
by mine contact and will present case studies of two countries,
Angola and Cambodia, to demonstrate not only individual
hardships created by mine deployment, but their effect on the
social and economic well-being of an entire nation. Part II of this
Comment will examine past attempts by the United Nations to
regulate land mines, which have not been successful. Part III will
give a brief history of the Ottawa Process, which culminated in the
treaty agreed to by close to 100 nations in Oslo. Part IV will
outline the policy reasons for the United States' decision not to
sign the Oslo treaty. Finally, Part V will analyze the pros and cons
of the United States' decision and how this decision may effect the
overall success of the treaty.
A. Land Mines Threaten Worldwide Population
The problems created by land mine deployment throughout
the world are severe and the statistics that have arisen from deaths
and amputees are startling. Land mines have handicapped over
250,000 people worldwide.9 Each month alone, land mines kill 800
people and maim 1200.10 In fact, land mines are responsible for
7. America, Absent on Land Mines, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1997, at A34.
8. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Oslo, Norway, Sept.
18, 1997 [hereinafter Convention].
9. Gilles Laffon, Land Mines: The Incredible Cost on the World, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESS, Sept. 18, 1997 (according to the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) Angola, Eritrea, Mozambique, Somalia and Sudan as well as
Afghanistan, Cambodia, Bosnia and Iraq have been the hardest hit by land mine
casualties).
10. Pressure Growing to Cut Off Use of Land Mines, PANTAGRAPH, Aug. 18,
1997, at Al, (according to reports distributed by American Red Cross); see also
Laffon, supra note 9 (indicating that other reports estimate that land mines kill
closer to 2000 people a month).
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a victim every twenty minutes.1 Unfortunately, an overwhelming
and growing majority of the victims are civilians. 2
The death and amputee casualties caused by mine deployment
have created tremendous economic problems worldwide. The cost
of making an anti-personnel mine is only thirty dollars, and some
may be bought for less than that.13 However, it costs between
three hundred and 1,000 dollars to search and clear a single anti-
personnel land mine.14 Many young children are victims of land
mines, and they are faced with a life-long struggle to survive.15
Furthermore, because most of these children are from third world
countries and low income families, they are relegated to a lifetime
with crutches.16
The problem created by many years of land mine deployment
worldwide is not going to go away quickly. In fact, one hundred
and ten million live charges remain buried in the ground in more
than sixty countries worldwide. 7 This number represents one
mine for every sixty human beings on earth.18 Experts estimate
that at the current rate of clearance, it would cost thirty-three
billion dollars and would take eleven centuries to clear all existing
mines worldwide. 9
B. General Patterns of Injuries From Land Mines
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) studied
patients in two of its hospitals for patients injured in war areas.2"
Seven hundred and fifty-seven patients were studied who had
sustained injuries from contact with anti-personnel land mines.2'
However, this study only related to victims actually admitted to
11. See Pressure Growing, supra note 10.
12. Laffon, supra note 9.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id. (finding that for a ten-year old child who loses a limb due to a land
mine this child could have to get twenty-five different prostheses during his or her
lifetime, at a cost of $3125).
16. See id. (according to the ICRC individuals in most third-world countries
have an income of $15 a month).
17. Woodward, supra note 1 (finding that many of these mines are American
made).
18. Pressure Growing, supra note 10.
19. Laffon, supra note 9.
20. Robin M. Coupland and Adriaan Korver, Injuries From Antipersonnel
Mines: The Experience of the International Committee of the Red Cross, BRrISH
MEDICAL JOURNAL, Dec. 14, 1991, at 1509 (LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File).
21. Id. at 1510.
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ICRC hospitals. Most of the seriously injured victims are not seen
due to the long and extenuating excavation problem in getting the
injured from remote areas to the hospital.22 The ICRC was
mostly interested in studying the patterns of those injured and the
potential drain that the injuries created on surgical resources.2 3
The ICRC concluded from its study that there were three
recognizable patterns of injuries seen at their hospitals. 24 Pattern
one injuries are triggered by a person standing on a buried mine.2 1
The result is usually an immediate amputation of a lower limb or
part of a lower limb because the mine is specifically designed to
incapacitate in this way.26 These injuries are the greatest drain on
surgical and transfusion resources.2
Pattern two injuries result from the detonation of a fragment
mine.2' These mines resemble a grenade and are often triggered by
a trip wire.29  A person who triggers or detonates these mines
rarely survives. 3°  Others in the immediate area may also be
injured by flying fragments. 31 This pattern of injury was the most
common of all those that were studied.32
A pattern three injury is triggered by a person handling a
mine.33 Because of the direct contact with the mine, most of these
patients required amputations of part or all of their arms and
22. See id. at 1511. According to ICRC the long and difficult path to get
medical assistance in the hospitals means that the most seriously injured are not
brought to the hospital and often die in the field. Id. at 1510. In fact, of those
victims studied in this report, most were admitted to the ICRC hospital six to
twenty-four hours after they were injured. Id.
23. See Coupland and Korver, supra note 20, at 1509 (according to the authors
of this report the stated objective was "to describe and quantify patterns of injury
from antipersonnel mines in terms of distribution of injury, drain on surgical
resources, and residual disability").
24. Id. (stating that each pattern carries its own implication for the surgeon
and the patients' long term disability prognosis).
25. Id.
26. See id. (finding also that these patients often suffer bilateral amputations
and arm, central body and genital injuries).
27. See Coupland and Korver, supra note 20, at 1511.
28. See id. at 1509 (explaining that these injuries were more random, mainly
consisting of multiple fragment wounds all over the body).
29. Id. at 1509-1510. These mines may also be ejected from the ground for the
purpose of exploding at waist height and thus creating upper body injuries. Id.
30. Id. at 1510 (citing Adams, D.B., Schwab, C.W., Twenty One Year Experi-
ence with Land Mine Injuries, F. TRAUMA 28 (suppl): S159-62 (1988)).
31. See Coupland and Korver, supra note 20, at 1510.
32. Id. at 1511.
33. Id. at 1510 (stating that those digging up or defusing a mine, laying the
mine or in the case of children, playing with the mine, represent the most common
victims of these types of mines).
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hands. 34 Furthermore, ten out of forty-one of the patients with
pattern three injuries sustained eye injuries as well.35 Overall, the
surgical demand for pattern three injuries was the smallest drain on
surgical resources.36
C. Case Studies: Cambodia and Angola
The statistics involving anti-personnel land mine fatalities and
amputees are startling. The effects of these mines have very
practical and threatening consequences to the nations that have
seen extensive mine deployment. By briefly highlighting two of the
nations hardest hit by the use of anti-personnel land mines,
Cambodia and Angola, the overall effect of these gruesome
statistics can be given a real world perspective. This will ultimately
illustrate the economic and social consequences to the many third
world countries that have been devastated by years of mine
deployment.
1. Cambodia-A passenger arriving at Cambodia's Phnom
Penh airport need only go to the visa desk for an immediate
encounter with one of Cambodia's biggest national problems, land
mines.37  A poster hangs on the wall behind the desk to warn
visitors of the eight to ten million mines currently in Cambodian
soil.38 Warnings tell visitors that guerrillas tend to use bent twigs
to warn their fellow guerrillas of nearby mines.39 Furthermore,
the poster portrays civilian mine victims with black and white
photographs.4
0
The United States State Department has categorized Cambo-
dia as "a textbook case of a country crippled by uncleared land
mines.",41 They reiterate that "in no country in the world have
34. See id. at 1511 (finding that precisely thirty percent of those with pattern
three injuries with injured upper limbs receive amputations).
35. Id. (stating that those with eye injuries had varying degrees of vision loss).
36. See Coupland and Korver, supra note 20, at 1511.
37. K.C. Swanson, Pentagon's Fighting a Ban on Mines, NAT'L J., Feb. 17,
1996, at 370.
38. Id. (stating that these mines have been a result of years of turmoil and
guerilla warfare in Cambodia).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. THE ARMS PROJECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH AND PHYSICIANS FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, LANDMINES A DEADLY LEGACY 166 (1993) [hereinafter ARMS
PROJECT] (quoting OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, U.S.
DEPT. OF STATE, HIDDEN KILLERS: THE GLOBAL PROBLEM WITH UNCLEARED
LANDMINES 37 (1993)).
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uncleared land mines had such an enormous adverse impact as in
Cambodia"." In fact, Cambodia currently has over 30,000
amputees. 4 3 In 1990 alone, 6000 Cambodians suffered amputa-
tions." Cambodia has the highest percentage of amputees of any
country in the world. Experts estimate that one out of two
hundred and thirty-six Cambodians have lost one or more limbs.46
The anti-personnel land mines that scatter the countryside of
Cambodia are a result of the Vietnam conflict and many years of
civil war.47  Five groups are primarily responsible for the mine
deployment in Cambodia: (1) Vietnam government; (2) Hun Sen;
(3) Khmer Rouge; (4) Khmer People's National Liberation Front
(KPNCF); and (5) Prince Sihenouk's United Front for an Indepen-
dent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia, (FUN-
CINPEC). 48
The land mines that cover half of the Cambodian country-
side49 have had a major negative effect on Cambodia's agricultur-
al economy. Without land mines, Cambodia could increase its total
farmable land one hundred and thirty-five percent, or 6608 hectares
in addition to the current farmable land of 4904 hectares ° Very
large amounts of agricultural land have officially been rendered
42. Id. at 165 (quoting HIDDEN KILLERS at 64).
43. Id. at 166.
44. Id. (finding that most of these casualties were civilians, which included a
high number of peasants that stepped on mines while farming).
45. Id. at 173.
46. Norman B. Smith, A Plea for the Total Ban of Land Mines By Interna-
tional Treaty, LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 507, 510 (1995).
47. See ARMS PROJECT, supra note 41, at 167; see also Smith, supra note 46,
at 510 (stating that four to seven million uncleared land mines remain scattered
in Cambodia).
48. See ARMS PROJECT, supra note 41, at 167 (finding that most of these
mines were laid between 1979 and 1991).
49. See id. at 165 (finding that half of the country contains heavy concen-
trations of land mines and are largely deployed along Cambodia's seven hundred
kilometer border with Thailand).
50. Neil Anderson, et al., Social Cost of Land Mines in Four Countries:
Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cambodia, and Mozambique, BRITISH MEDIAL JOURNAL,
Sept. 16, 1995, at 718 (LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File) (stating that the figures
of farmable land have been calculated from a study in which 6090 households in
Cambodia were interviewed in thirty-eight different villages representing over
33,950 total Cambodians).
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unusable.51 As a result, there are grave difficulties in the country-
side for families to provide adequate food.52
Rural populations who once relied on the fields now rendered
unusable have moved to Phnom Penh and other towns and
cities.53 This exodus has more than doubled Phnom Penh's
population and has thus put social strains on its limited infrastruc-
ture.54 Furthermore, because most civilian amputees never get
artificial limbs, they tend to drift to Phnom Penh or larger towns,
and become beggars or petty criminals.55
Cambodia is in no economic condition to handle the medical
needs of land mine victims.56 The cost is very high to manufac-
ture and distribute the number of artificial limbs needed.57 In
1991, only one in eight amputees received an artificial limb and
most of those amputees were soldiers.5s Most civilian amputees
are sent home with no rehabilitation and very little chance of
receiving an artificial limb.59 Unfortunately, Cambodia has no
laws to protect these amputees against discrimination or exploita-
tion.6 °
51. ARMS PROJECr, supra note 41, at 166 (finding also that the nation's road
network is so polluted with land mines that civilians often cannot travel from one
village to another or, if they can, are kept to very small footpaths).
52. See BRIT. MED. J., supra note 50, at 35 (finding that households with a
mine victim were forty percent more likely to report difficulty in providing food
for the family).
53. See ARMS PROJECT, supra note 41, at 166 (stating that the exodus to the
cities has greatly lessened Cambodia's agricultural output).
54. See id.
55. See id. at 175. Amputees in a largely rural society often find that they
cannot compete with able-bodied persons for farmland and production. Also,
female amputees are found less desirable as wives and in some cases women have
abandoned their husbands as they become more impoverished. Id.
56. See ARMS PROJECT, supra note 41, at 175. Cambodia has a very poor
health care system. Many of the hospitals are grossly overpopulated forcing
patients to sleep outside on cots and bamboo mats or just prop themselves up
against the wall. Id. at 174.
* 57. See id. at 176 (finding that only one-half of the amputees in Cambodia
have artificial limbs).
58. Id.
59. See id. (finding that even though some civilians might have heard about
workshops that produce artificial limbs (Cambodia has twelve such shops), they
often elect to return directly to their villages and towns rather than pay the extra
expense involved in buying an artificial limb).
60. ARMS PROJECT, supra note 41, at 175-76 (stating that the past Hun Sen
government was supposed to provide a monthly pension for the amputees, but
relief agencies in Cambodia have reported that either there was one lump sum
payment at the beginning or there was no payment made at all).
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Land mines have not only killed and maimed the people of
Cambodia,6' but they have also devastated the nation.62 The
social and economic structure has been weakened as the result of
caring for victims, manufacturing and supplying artificial limbs and
supporting those victims who become unable to support them-
selves. 63  Cambodia has felt the tremendous negative impact of
over thirteen years of mine deployment.64
2. Angola-When the Portuguese withdrew from Angola in
1974 and a civil war ensued,65 land mines were used to reduce the
amount of agricultural lands among the rival populations.6 These
mines were deployed in civilian areas thereby creating many
hazards for the Angolan civil population.67
Angola is second only to Cambodia in the highest per capita
ratio of land mine victims in the world.6" Between 1975 and 1991,
6728 people were killed by mine explosions. 69 In Angola, howev-
er, and unlike other nations that have suffered due to mine deploy-
ment, there is a greater chance that children will be mine vic-
tims.7 ° In fact, according to a 1990 survey of the one hundred and
thirteen land mine victims recorded by the ICRC, twenty-nine were
children.71
The statistics representing the Angolans who have been
maimed are as shocking as those of the number killed. There are
61. See id. at 173 (noting that Cambodia has the highest number of amputees
of any country in the world per population).
62. See id. at 166.
63. ARMS PROJECT, supra note 41, at 175-177 (The September 1991 Asia
Watch and Physicians for Human Rights report, Land Mines in Cambodia, stated
that "[t]he widespread presence and density of land mines in Cambodia must be
considered a humanitarian emergency, separate from, and regardless of, the other
crises facing the Khmer people,"). Id. at 183.
64. See ARMS PROJECT, supra note 41, at 167.
65. Jack H. McCall, Infernal Machines and Hidden Death: International Law
and Limits on the Indiscriminate Use of Land Mine Warfare, 24 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 229, 247 (1994).
66. Id. (finding the mines have increasingly been used in Angola in non-tradi-
tional ways among the warring factions to create famine in other groups by
reducing the amount of agricultural lands and by strangling the roads and
damaging the supply and transportation network).
67. See id. There are three main warring factions in Angola: one largely sup-
ported by the Soviet Union and Cuba; another receives support from Zaire and
South Africa; and the third receives support primarily from the United States. Id.
(citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Land Mines in Angola 59 (1993)).
68. See ARMS PROJECT, supra note 41, at 150.
69. Id. at 155.
70. See McCall, supra note 65, at 247.
71. ARMS PROJECT, supra note 41, at 155.
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now at least 15,000 Angolan amputees.72 One-half of these
amputees are civilians.73 Five thousand artificial limbs are needed
yearly and this number far exceeds the number Angola can afford
to manufacture.74
The Angolan economic and social structure, like Cambodia's,
has also been devastated due to land mine deployment.75 The
inability to travel freely on Angolan roads is a formidable obstacle
to the movement of any commerce.76 Furthermore, because there
is little hope for the maimed to be rehabilitated, their chances of
finding employment and food in an agrarian economy are very
lOW.7 7  This, in turn, has created a huge refugee problem in
Angola which further drains the nation's economic resources. 78
The prospect of ending this problem in Angola appears
hopeless. The efforts to clear the more than twenty million
mines79 laid during the civil war has been inadequate." The
Angolan government has been hampered by a lack of equipment,
money and cooperation." To make matters worse, the interna-
tional community has not made a strong commitment to assisting
Angola in its mine clearing efforts.8 2
The people of Angola and the nation itself have suffered
enormously due to the mines laid as a result of years of civil war
and strife. Due to the nature of the war, little consideration was
72. McCall, supra note 65, at 247.
73. ARMS PROJECT, supra note 41, at 150 (stating that civilians are often
injured in their fields or while working on roads, riverbanks and inside built-up
areas).
74. See id.; see also McCall, supra note 65, at 247 (finding that emergency
care and first aid in Angola is extremely rudimentary, and rehabilitation for the
amputees is seldom available).
75. See ARMS PROJECT, supra note 41, at 159 (stating that thousands of acres
of farmland, pastures, forest and riverbanks are now unusable).
76. See id. (finding that relief supplies can only be delivered nationwide with
great fear and difficulty).
77. McCall, supra note 65, at 247.
78. See id. (finding that the total number of refugees not only cripples the
Angolan economy but also seriously impedes the development of the political
process and the peace effort).
79. Smith, supra note 46, at 509.
80. See ARMS PROJECT, supra note 41, at 160; see also McCall, supra note 65,
at 247 (stating that there are thirty-seven different land mine types identified and
there are few minefield records left by the warring factions).
81. See ARMS PROJECT, supra note 41, at 161; see also McCall, supra note 65,
at 247.
82. See ARMS PROJECT, supra note 41, at 160.
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given for protection of the civilian population.83 This devastation
demonstrates the effect that land mines can have on the existence
and progress of an entire nation.
II. The United Nation's Past Legislative Attempts to Regulate
Land Mines
In September of 1979, The United Nations General Assembly
organized the "Prohibition or Restrictions of Use of Certain Con-
ventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Inju-
rious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects" in response to the
excessive and unnecessary suffering brought on by mines and
booby traps.' The result of this conference was a draft of a
document limiting or abolishing certain weapons, including land
mines." A second session was organized in 1980 in which eighty-
five nations participated.86 Following this session in 1980, the
conference adopted the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or have Indiscriminate Effects,
commonly known as the "Conventional Weapons Treaty," on
October 10, 1980.87 The original draft protocol on land mines was
then integrated into this Conventional Weapons Convention as its
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions in the Use of Mines,
Booby Traps, Other Devices, commonly known as "Protocol II.88
The goal of the drafters of Protocol II was to limit the use of
anti-personnel land mines deployed against civilian populations.
89
Protocol II falls short of a complete ban on the use of anti-
83. See id. at 156 (stating additionally that 84 percent of the civilian injuries
occurred on either paths or roads, while only sixteen percent of the total injuries
occurred in inhabited areas).
84. See McCall, supra note 65, at 252, 239 (citing Dietrich Schindler and Jiri
Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions
and Other Documents 179 (1988)). Id. at 239.
85. See McCall, supra note 65, at 252 (finding that even up until 1994, the
essence of this agreement remained the key international agreement explicitly
regulating mine warfare and its conduct).
86. Id.
87. Id. (explaining the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II), Oct. 10, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/-
CONF.95/15, also reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1534 [hereinafter Protocol II].).
88. ARMS PROJECr, supra note 41, at 261-62.
89. See id. at 262.
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personnel land mines.9" Rather, it places certain restrictions on
how these anti-personnel mines may be used.91
Article three of Protocol II is the general section aimed
directly at protecting civilians.9' Specifically, article three, section
two prohibits offensive and defensive deployment of all mines
against both the general civilian population and individual
civilians.93  The rest of the article sets up a balancing test to
determine if the human casualties resulting from deployed mines
outweigh the military advantage.94
The other provisions of Protocol II follow the pattern of
protecting civilian populations as demonstrated by article three.
Article four prohibits the use of land mines in areas of civilian
concentrations except when those areas contain real military
targets.95 Articles five and six prohibit the use of so-called
remotely delivered mines, again except in areas which contain
military targets. 96 Finally, articles seven and nine require the
marking and recording of minefields and the sharing of such
information once the hostility or fighting has ceased.97
Although a worthy attempt, Protocol II has often been
characterized as a dismal failure as a solution to the land mine
problem.9" The biggest criticism of it is that it really only regulated
the placement of land mines rather than prohibiting their use and
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. Smith, supra note 46, at 526. Protocol II does not define "civilian" but
rather the definition is taken from Protocol I written in 1977. Id. "Civilians" were
defined as "persons not members of armed forces or organized armed groups."
Id.
93. See ARMS PROJECT, supra note 41, at 291; see also McCall, supra note 65,
at 253 (citing Protocol II, art. 3(4) and stating that belligerent parties engaging in
mine warfare are expected to take "all feasible precautions" under humanitarian
and military considerations to protect civilians from mine warfare).
94. See ARMS PROJECT, supra note 41, at 286. Article 3(3) prohibits the
placement of mines:
(a) which are not on or directed at a military object; or,
(b) which employ a method of means of delivery which cannot be
directed at a specific military objective; or,
(c) which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury
to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated.
Id.
95. See McCall, supra note 65, at 254.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 256 (finding specifically that article nine calls for complete
cooperation between belligerents once the fighting has ceased).
98. See ARMS PROJECT, supra note 41, at 263.
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transfer.99 Due to the delayed-action in which mines operate,
under Protocol II, it is perfectly lawful to place mines directed at
a military object even though they may cause indiscriminate injuries
to civilians years later."° Other criticisms include: Protocol II's
lack of enforcement mechanisms; the international community's
failure to both rectify and enforce this Agreement; military
commanders' abuse of discretion in deciding what is or is not a
military objective; and a lack of clear examples and consistent
definitions.1"'
Protocol II has failed in its chief objective to protect civilians
from the horrors brought by the indiscriminate use of land
mines.0 2 Land mines are still injuring civilians.0 3 Little adher-
ence has been given to the military objective requirement even
when harm to civilians outweighs any possible military gain."
Furthermore, since Protocol II became effective, the development
of new technologies in land mines has made it easier to deploy
undetectable land mines in civilian populations.0 5 Finally, the
statistics representing the number of civilian casualties since 1983
clearly demonstrate that this agreement has not been very success-
ful.
10 6
One of the hot debates at the conference on The Conventional
Weapons Treaty was whether Protocol II should just seek restric-
tions on the use of land mines or a categorical total ban."0 7
Arguments were made for a total ban.1°8 However, despite the
arguments put forward for a total ban, a proposal for placing
restrictions on the use won out.0 9 The conference delegates
concluded that the harmful and indiscriminate effects of land mines
on civilians could be adequately controlled by regulations on mine
99. See id. at 290 (contrasting Protocol I which banned attacks of mines to
Protocol II, which under Article 3(3)(b) only prohibits the placement of mines).
100. See id.
101. See McCall, supra note 65, at 260.
102. See Smith, supra note 46, at 530-31; see also McCall, supra note 65, at 252.
For the first ten years Protocol II was in effect, many of the most egregious
examples of unrestricted land mine warfare occurred. Id.
103. See Smith, supra note 46, at 530-31.
104. See id. at 531.
105. See id.
106. See ARMS PROJECT, supra note 41, at 263.
107. Id. at 275-76.
108. Id. at 275-76 (stating that arguments were put forward that a flat ban
would be precise, that partial restrictions would be ineffective particularly where
too much discretion would be given to field commanders and that a total ban
would be much easier to enforce and implement).
109. Id. at 277.
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deployment."' However, as noted above, these restrictions
proved ineffective."' Thus, it only seems realistic that the next
major international attempt to deal with this world-wide problem
would involve a total ban on the use of anti-personnel mines.
III. The Ottawa Process
On September 17, 1997, after a two week long-conference in
Oslo, Norway, close to one hundred nations agreed on a Treaty to
ban the use of anti-personnel land mines. 2 This Treaty is a
result of an eleven-month long process, initiated in Canada, which
has now become known as the Ottawa Process."3 This Treaty
represents the first intentional agreement to totally ban the use of
anti-personnel mines.1 4
The Treaty agreed to in Oslo has come to fruition largely as
the result of the hard work and perseverance of those who have
dedicated themselves to defeating this world wide killer of innocent
civilians. One of the most famous supporters of this effort was the
late Princess Diana."5 She took up the cause in January of
1997.16 Diana personally walked through a minefield in Angola
and consoled the victims of land mines in Bosnia."7 Her efforts
were instrumental in publicizing and obtaining world-wide recogni-
tion of this issue, which also undoubtedly vaulted the Ottawa
Process to the point it has now reached in the form of an official
Treaty.8
The official name of the agreement coming out of the Oslo
Conference is the "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and
on Their Destruction." "' The major provision of this Agree-
ment is Article one, entitled "General Obligations," which prohibits
the use, development, production and stockpiling of anti-personnel
110. See id.
111. ARMS PROJECT, supra note 41, at 263.
112. See N.Y. TIMES, supra note 7, at A34.
113. In Questionable Company; U.S. Rejects Treaty But Says It Will Press Effort
Against Land Mines, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1997, at B8.
114. Lagging on Land Mines, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1997, at A34.
115. Mary McCrory, Clinton in the Mine Minority, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1997,
at A2.
116. Id. (stating the Princess Diana's recognition of this cause immediately sent
it to the top of the charts in the world's consciousness).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See Convention, supra note 8.
1998]
674 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:3
mines."2 Article two is a definition section.1"' Article three
creates a small exception for the use and transfer of mines for the
training of those involved in mine detection and clearance.2 2
Articles four and five govern both the destruction of existing and
stockpiled anti-personnel mines.22' Article eight addresses one of
the major deficiencies of Protocol II, by regulating the facilitation
and clarification of compliance for the entire Treaty.24 Article
eleven requires a meeting of the parties to the Treaty and article
twelve provides for the meeting of a Review Conference five years
after the Treaty becomes official. 25 Finally, article fifteen lists
the times and places that nations will be given the opportunity to
officially sign this Treaty.
126
IV. The United States Officially Decides Not to Sign the Treaty
The United States has decided not to add its name to the
Treaty signed in Oslo.2 7 President Clinton decided to join the
Ottawa process in August."~ A United States delegation of
negotiators was sent to Oslo, and they worked hard to get certain
120. See id. Article I specifically stated that:
1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
a) To use anti-personnel mines;
b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or
transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in
any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of




122. Id. at 3. Article three states in part:
1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article I, the retention
and or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development
of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction
techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the
minimum number absolutely necessary for the above mentioned purpose.
See Convention, supra note 8.




127. WILLIAM J. CLINTON, NEWS CONFERENCE ON LAND MINE TREATY, Sept.
17, 1997, FED. DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE POL. TRANSCRIPTS (1997).
128. See In Questionable Company, supra note 113, at B8 (announcing that
President Clinton's decision to join the Ottawa Process so late severely hurt the
United States' position).
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United States' exceptions accepted by the nations attending.129
During the second week at Oslo, the delegates from the United
States actually gained a one day delay, but ultimately they could
not budge the drafters. 3
The United States sought five basic exceptions to the current
draft of the Treaty agreed to in Oslo by close to one hundred
nations. First, and probably most important, the United States
wants to continue its use of anti-personnel land mines that are
deployed along the DMZ in Korea."' Also, the United States
wants "smart" self-destructing anti-personnel land mines permit-
ted132 and a deferral period of roughly nine years to allow techno-
logical advancements to be made which could possibly serve as
substitutes to land mines. Finally, the United States has asked for
improvement of the verification measures of the treaty and an
addition of a "supreme neutral interest" clause as a criteria for
dropping out of the treaty at war times.1 33
President Clinton has insisted that he cannot in good con-
sciousness sign the treaty as it is written.13 He is concerned that
if the United States gives up its anti-personnel mines in Korea, and
its anti-tank mines, our soldiers stationed in Korea and around the
world will be placed in jeopardy.135 The President has asked for
an adequate transition period so that the United States can
gradually phase out its use of anti-personnel mines by devising
alternate defense mechanisms.13 6
The United States' exceptions were ultimately rejected by the
other delegates in Oslo. 137 The nations agreed that granting the
exception would undermine the objectives and goals of the Ottawa
Process, which include a total ban on the use, production and
129. See Clinton, supra note 127 (noting that President Clinton praised his team
of negotiators in Oslo who worked tirelessly to reach an agreement that the
United States could sign).
130. Tim Burt, US Wins More Time for Landmine Pact, FIN. TIMES (London),
Sept. 17, 1997, at 5.
131. U.S. to Reject Ottawa Treaty If U.S. Proposals Excluded, JAPAN ECON.
NEWSWIRE, Sept. 12, 1997 (LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File).
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. Clinton, supra note 127; see also Sanity Prevails on Land Mines, WASH.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 1997, at A20.
135. See Clinton, supra note 127 (stating that the President, as commander-in-
chief, will not send our soldiers out to defend this country without doing
everything he can to make these soldiers as secure as possible).
136. See id.
137. See L.A. TIMES, supra note 113, at B8.
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stockpiling of anti-personnel land mines.138  Also, the delegates
were concerned that if they granted the United States' exceptions,
other nations, possibly Russia and China, would also seek their own
exceptions.'3 9  Therefore, the United States' proposals were
rejected in Oslo. 4 '
President Clinton has reiterated that the proposals the United
States made in Oslo are still on the bargaining table. 141 For now,
the President has instructed the Defense Department to devise
alternatives to anti-personnel land mines. 142 Ultimately, however,
it appears the world will move on and sign this agreement leaving
the United States behind.
V. Analysis of the United States' Decision Not to Sign the
Oslo Treaty
The United States decided not to sign the Oslo Treaty for
several reasons.143 This part of the Comment will address the
justifications for and the attacks on those specific reasons.
Highlighting this list are the "smart" mines issue, the Korean
Peninsula issue and the anti-tank mine issue. Furthermore, this
part will analyze how this decision not to sign may effect other
countries' decisions to sign and thus the treaty's overall effective-
ness. Finally, this part will evaluate the military necessity of having
anti-personnel mines in the Unites States' arsenal.
A. "Smart" Mines
The United States wants to continue to use its "smart" anti-
personnel and anti-tank mines.'" These mines, after being
activated, are designed to self-destruct within a matter of hours or
days. 4 ' Thus, the United States military personnel have termed
these self-destructive mines "smart" mines because essentially they
act on their own after being activated.'46
138. See Burt, supra note 130.
139. See id.
140. See L.A. TIMES, supra note 113, at B8.
141. See Clinton, supra note 127 (stating that the United States remains ready
to sign a treaty that meets or fundamental and unique security requirements).
142. See id.
143. See James Kitfield, Holding Out for "Smart" Land Mines, 29 NAT'L J.
1980, Oct. 4. 1997 (LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File).
144. See U.S. to Reject, supra note 131.
145. See Kitfield, supra note 143, at 1.
146. See id.
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The Defense Department asserts that "smart mines" have close
to a ninety-nine percent reliability rate. 147 Because they claim
that these mines are so effective in self-destructing within hours or
days after being activated, the Defense Department argues that
these mines are not deadly to non-combatants (civilians) who
would walk on battlefields days after the fighting was over.
14 1
The Pentagon has long lobbied that due to the success rate of
"smart" mines in the field, the United States is not responsible for
any of the land mine fatalities that occur annually.149 Thus, it is
argued that these mines are not a threat to non-combatants, so the
United States should be able to keep these weapons in its arsenal.
Those who oppose the United States' decision not to sign the
Oslo Treaty are not convinced that the "smart" mines are as
successful as the Defense Department claims. In fact, according to
some United States military studies, the "smart" mines have as high
as a twenty percent failure rate.15° These studies indicate that
these mines do not self-destruct automatically as they were
designed to do.' In their one test situation in Desert Storm, the
''smart" mines did not perform as well as the Defense Department
has claimed. 5 Therefore, it is argued that these mines may not
deactivate and thus will pose a threat to non-combatants who later
cross the battlefields. 53
Others who oppose this exception make moral arguments
against the Defense Department's reports and the Pentagon's
insistence on keeping "smart" mines in the United States military
arsenal. In particular, Nebraska Senator Chuck Hagel, who was
wounded twice by land mines in Vietnam, argues that "mines are
mines," and that such weapons are not completely reliable. 15 4




150. Donnette Dunbar, Land Mine Ban Trips Emotions, OMAHA-WORLD
HERALD, Oct. 4, 1997 (LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File).
151. See Kitfield, supra note 143.
152. See Jon Fransden, Study Shows Land Mines' Dangers, Charges They Are
of Limited Value, GANNET NEWS, July 28, 1997 (LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File).
153. See Kitfield, supra note 143.
154. Jon Fransden, Leahy Quietly Building Support for Land Mine Bill, GAN-
NET NEWS, June 11, 1997 (LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File).
155. See id. (stating that Hagel has held several conversations with military
advisors and is still convinced that land mines are not necessary for the United
States to accomplish its military objectives).
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to this exception and a leader worldwide in the push to ban all
anti-personnel mines, Patrick Leahy argues that "smart" mines are
not smart enough to tell the difference between a soldier and a
child.156 Thus, the mines present an equal risk to non-combatants
and soldiers, according to the argument.157
B. Korean Peninsula
The United States' decision not to sign the Oslo Treaty was
largely predicated on the inability of the delegates to get an
exception for the continued use of anti-personnel and anti-tank
mines along the demilitarized zone ("DMZ") in Korea.158 The
United States has deployed many land mines along the DMZ as a
defense mechanism against a possible North Korean invasion."'
The goal of the mine deployment is to slow the advance of a North
Korean attack so that the United States can organize and assemble
an adequate defense of South Korea."6
The Pentagon maintains that the use of mines along the DMZ
in Korea creates a unique situation where non-combatants are not
at any potential 'risk."' The DMZ in Korea differs from other
mined areas and countries because the- DMZ has been clearly
defined. 62  Civilians have been completely barred from the
DMZ.163  There are no villages along the DMZ.164 Therefore,
it is argued by the Pentagon that danger of civilian casualties due
to the mine deployment along the DMZ is almost nil.165
It is also argued that mine deployment along the DMZ is
necessary because of the instability of the North Korean govern-
ment which makes a threat of renewed aggression ever-present in
Korea.166 The current Pyongyang regime, according to some,
remains determined to launch an attack against South Korea and
156. Patrick Leahy, News Conference on Introduction of the Leahy-Hagel
Landmine Bill (S.896) (June 12, 1997).
157. See id.
158. L.A. TIMES, supra note 113, at B8.
159. See id.
160. See Clinton, supra note 127.
161. See Banning Land Mines at DMZ, KOREA HERALD, Aug. 13, 1997
(LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File).
162. See id.; see also Clinton, supra note 127 (announcing that the President
feels as if the DMZ represents a place like no other in the world).
163. Banning Land Mines, supra note 161, at 1; see also Clinton, supra note 126.
164. Clinton, supra note 126.
165. See id.
166. Banning Land Mines, supra note 161.
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its allies.167 It will only be possible to remove our mines from the
DMZ when the North Koreans renounce their ongoing policy of
provocation and it is evident that they are not a threat to attack
South Korea. 168 Furthermore, the President argues that it is now,
when the North Koreans feel threatened and most helpless, that
they are most dangerous.
169
The mines along the DMZ are seen as a military necessity to
slow down a possible North Korean invasion.17 The North
Korean army, one million strong, is only twenty-seven miles away
from Seoul.'71 In the event of an attack, the North's overwhelm-
ing numerical advantage can only be countered by the United
States if we can slow down the North Korean advance, call in
reinforcements and adequately organize a defense.172 Thus, these
mines are crucial to a successful defense.
The strongest argument for the Korean Peninsula exception is
the protection of the 37,000 American troops that serve in South
Korea. 173  These troops serve under the direct mandate of the
international community.'74 Therefore, because our troops are
needed in Korea to help preserve the peace, it is a strong argument
that the United States should do all that is possible to ensure the
safety of these troops.1
75
Those who oppose the United States decision not to sign the
Oslo Treaty do not view North Korea as this ticking bomb just
waiting to cross the DMZ and attack South Korea. 7 6 It is argued
that North Korea is a country that is falling apart. 77 They have
trouble just feeding their people. 78 North Korea is in such bad
shape that it poses no real military threat.'79 Thus, when the
167. Id.
168. Id.
S169. Clinton, supra note 127.
170. See Banning Land Mines, supra note 161.
171. Clinton, supra note 127.
172. Id.
173. Id. (stating that the President will not send United States soldiers into




176. 143 CONG. REC. S9778 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1997) (statement of Sen. Patrick
Leahy).
177. Jeff Johnson, Land Mines and North Korea, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONT-
ITOR, Sept. 18, 1997, at 20.
178. Id.
179. Leahy, supra note 176 (noting that the Pentagon has even been internally
divided as to some of the arguments it has made to the White House regarding the
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Pentagon analyzes the potential losses in a North Korean invasion,
it is argued that they should also factor in the likelihood that the
North Koreans could or would invade at all.' Given the reali-
ties of the current state of North Korea, the likelihood is essentially
zero.1
8 1
Senator Leahy argues that anti-personnel and anti-tank mines
are not a military necessity along the DMZ.l s2 Those who argue
the mines are a necessity in slowing the advance of the North
Koreans, ignore the conclusions of many Pentagon analysts who
have found that a North Korean invasion would be destroyed, with
or without anti-personnel land mines, before it couldpossibly travel
down narrow, pre-targeted mountain passes to Seoul.183 The
United States does not need these mines to defend against a
possible North Korean invasion."
The effectiveness of the mines along the DMZ is also ques-
tioned and attacked by those that oppose the United States'
decision not to sign the Oslo Treaty.'85 They argue that we
should look back to the Korean War and analyze the ineffective-
ness of the United States mines during that conflict.186 In fact,
excerpts from recently-released Army studies show that United
States troops in Korea were killed by their own defensive mine
fields."8 7 The mines planted near Seoul in 1951 did nothing to
deter the Chinese, who cleared the mine fields and marched on
with a "human wave" of soldiers.188  Furthermore, when the
necessity of mine deployment in Korea).
180. See Johnson, supra note 177.
181. Id. (arguing that for no actual benefit, but just to flex the military muscle,
the Pentagon is pressuring the government into letting a historical opportunity to
ban all land mines pass).
182. Leahy, supra note 176, at S9780. President Clinton has called Senator
Patrick Leahy from Vermont a genuine worldwide leader in the land mine reform
effort, who is recognized around the world for his efforts to ban anti-personnel
land mines. See Clinton, supra note 127.
183. See Leahy, supra note 176, at S9780 (announcing that if anti-personnel
mines are going to determine the fate of South Korea, they ought to surrender).
184. Id. (finding additionally that the current Oslo Treaty allows for a twelve-
year grace period for removing existing minefields such as in Korea, a fact that
some in the administration not even aware of when they were pressuring the
President into not signing).
185. See Fransden, supra note 152.
186. See id.
187. Otto Kreisher, Old Army Report Says U.S. Mines Deadlier to GIs Than to
Enemy, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., July 30, 1997, at A-10 (finding that this study
was released by the anti-mine coalition, which includes Human Rights Watch and
the Veitnam Veterans of America Foundation).
188. Fransden, supra note 152.
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United States troops fought the Chinese back and retook Seoul,
they were often slowed by those same defensive mines.189 Thus,
the implication is that the North Koreans could possibly clear our
mine fields the same way the Chinese did some forty years ago.19
Moreover, if the United States fought the North Koreans back to
the thirty-ninth parallel, our soldiers may be slowed and some
suffer the same fate as those who were killed by our mines in the
Korean War.' Those who oppose the decision not to sign the
treaty argue that this scenario indicates that the effectiveness of our
mines along the DMZ would be limited."9
The ability of the South Koreans to make their own defense
is cited as another reason why mines along the DMZ are not a
military necessity.'93 South Korea has a better trained and better
equipped army then its North Korean counterpart. 9 4  Also, the
South Koreans are technologically advanced and they are better
motivated than the North Koreans. 95 Furthermore, the South
Koreans are supported by the United States, which is considered
the most powerful nation on the Earth. 196
The opponents of the Korean exception also use evidence of
existing alternatives in the United States arsenal that would make
mines along the DMZ replaceable.' 97 A Pentagon report released
in May of 1997 stated that effective alternatives to the use of anti-
personnel mines should be feasible by using a combination of
current and future technologies, combat forces and military
doctrine.198  The report uses Korea as an example. 99 It states
that the mines in Korea could be replaced by the use of the
Multiple Rocket System, or other use of new technologies, "whose
ability to precisely locate targets lessens the need to rely on
189. Id.; see also Kreisher, supra note 187 (noting that United States' mines
killed or maimed more Americans than enemy troops in Korea, in fact, thousands
of Americans were injured or killed when they maneuvered into mines that had
been stolen and replanted by the enemy).
190. Id.





196. Leahy, supra note 176, at S9780.
197. See Davis Isenburg, US Lauds, but Thwarts, Diana's Call for Mine Ban,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept. 10, 1997, at 19. David Isenburg is a senior
research analyst at the Center for Defense Information in Washington. Id.
198. Id. (arguing that this report released by the Pentagon is evidence that even
American military officials admit that land mines are replaceable).
199. Id.
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indiscriminate weapons such as land mines. 200 Thus, unlike the
alternatives the President has sought to be in place by the year
2006, it is argued that existing technological military weapons could
serve as feasible alternatives to the use of anti-personnel and anti-
tank mines along the DMZ on the Korean peninsula.20 '
C. Anti-Tank Issue
The Oslo Treaty contains an explicit exception for anti-tank
mines. 2 2  However, this exception does not cover the United
States' aiti-tank mine systems because the United States' system
includes the use of anti-personnel mines. 2 3  Thus, the United
States has kept the anti-tank system off of the bargaining table and
has insisted that this system be granted an exception before signing
the Oslo Treaty.2°  When the Oslo countries would not agree to
granting this exception, the United States delegates considered it
a deal-breaker.2 5
The changes in modern warfare have necessitated the United
States insistence on its continued use of anti-tank mine systems. 20
6
The United States' continuing reliance on these systems is clearly
obvious by observing training exercises at the Army's National
Training Center (NTC) in California's Mojave Desert.2 7 The
military's goal is to become better equipped in fighting a modern
war that requires striking quickly and flexibility.28 A major tool
in the military's strategy is the use of rapidly scatterable anti-tank
mines that are delivered by artillery shells or cluster bombs. 2°
200. Id.
201. See Isenburg, supra note 197, at 19.
202. Convention, supra note 8; see also Clinton, supra note 127.
203. See Kitfield, supra note 143.
204. Id. (finding that although President Clinton has given the Pentagon until
the year 2003 to find alternatives for anti-personnel mines, with an exception for
Korea to the year 2006, he has stood firm on continuing to use the anti-tank mine
systems).
205. Id. When the United States' delegates stance on the anti-tank/anti-person-
nel mine issue was rejected by the delegates in Oslo the President was faced with
a treaty that all six members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed. -Id.
206. See id. at 3.
207. Id. (stating that the evidence that mines are vital to the United States's
military is only more obvious in Korea than at the National Training Center).
208. See Kitfield, supra note 143. In nearly every scenario of mock combat
between armed forces at the NTC, the emphasis remains on-what the military calls
"shaping the battlefield." Id.
209. Id.
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Thus, the military sees the anti-tank mine system as a necessity to
successfully fighting on the modern battlefield.210
Downsizing and other changes in the United States military
since the end of the Cold War have greatly magnified the Army's
need to use rapidly deployable anti-tank systems. 21  Now, when
controversies arise worldwide, the military must rapidly deploy
lighter forces. 212  The anti-tank mine systems have become an
integral part to supporting these lighter forces which have increased
responsibilities in the new United States military strategy.213
Senator Leahy argues that if the use of anti-personnel mines
near anti-tank mines prevents the United States from signing the
Oslo Treaty, the United States should solve this problem.214 The
United States has been lagging on developing a new anti-tank
system that could be used effectively without the use of anti-
personnel mines.215 The Pentagon should invest time and re-
sources to solving this problem, which compared to the United
States ability to lead by example on this issue seems quite
small.216 According to Senator Leahy, the world both wants and
needs the United States leadership.217
D. Possible Effects of the United States Decision Not to Sign the
Treaty
The United States is the world's greatest democracy and has
historically been a leading force in significant humanitarian law
treaties and arms control efforts worldwide.218 Our power,
influence and moral authority remain unmatched. 219 The chemi-
cal weapons treaty, for instance, would not exist had the United
States not taken the initiative and supported this Agreement.220
So, the issue becomes whether the United States decision not to
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. Kitfield, supra note 154. The number of contingency deployments the
Army has planned has risen 300 percent since 1989. Id.
213. Id.
214. Leahy, supra note 176, at S9780.
215. See id.
216. See id. Senator Leahy often argues that the United States is in a position
to lead others by example, and by not signing the Oslo Treaty we make it an easy
excuse for other nations not to come on board as well. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See Leahy, supra note 176, at S9780.
220. See id. (noting that the nuclear test ban treaty would not exist today if it
was not for the United States leadership).
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sign the Oslo Treaty will be a significant deterrent to the overall
effectiveness of this treaty?
The President makes the argument that until the world can get
the major producers of land mines to stop making, selling and using
them, the absence of the United States a a signatory of the Oslo
Treaty will remain largely irrelevant.22' Countries such as China,
Iraq, Iran and North Korea are all busy merchants of mines and all
seem committed to opposing any ban on anti-personnel mines.222
Past negotiating attempts with these countries during the United
Nations sponsored arms control negotiation "Conference on
Disarmament" have proven unsuccessful on the land mine
issue."' Furthermore, because these exporters remain high on
the list of potential United States adversaries, it increases the
likelihood that the United States Army could be at a disadvantage
in future conflicts. 24 Thus, the effectiveness of the Oslo Treaty
should not center around the United States decision not to sign, but
rather on the major exporters and their decisions not to sign.225
The President further argues that the United States has done
its fair share on the land mine issue and will continue to be a
leader on this issue, even if we do not sign the Oslo Treaty.226
The United States has unilaterally stopped producing, selling and
using land mines.2 We have destroyed a million and a half land
mines worldwide.228 Thus, the United States has made a commit-
ment to the land mine issue and has plans to continue its efforts in
helping to cope with this worldwide crisis.229
Those who oppose the United States decision not to sign the
Oslo Treaty argue that until the United States does agree to sign,
this treaty will never come even remotely close to being a world-
wide ban.23° Senator Leahy argues that "there is simply no
221. Clinton, supra note 127.
222. See George Will, Parchment and Pacification, A Ban on Anti-Personnel
Land Mines May be the Next Bad Idea Whose Time Has Come, NEWSWEEK, July
21, 1997, at 80.
223. Kitfield, supra note 143.
224. Id. (stating that American military leaders argue that because the United
States has troops in hot zones such as Bosnia, the Persian Gulf and Korea, the
United States has special military responsibilities and needs).
225. See Will, supra note 222, at 80.
226. See Clinton, supra note 127.
227. Id.
228. Clinton, supra note 127. The President also points out that the United
States has plans to destroy another million and a half by 1999. Id.
229. See generally id.
230. See, e.g., Leahy, supra note 176, at S9778.
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substitute for the credibility and influence of the United States to
bring reluctant nations on board.""23 Senator Hagel adds that by
signing this Treaty the United States will place itself on the side of
the moral high ground, and from this side we will be in a position
to influence other nations.232 The United States needs to provide
moral leadership internationally on this issue.233 Our indecision
and non-support evidenced by not signing this Treaty will surely
undermine the long effort to reach a total ban.234
Senator Leahy argues that the United States decision not to
support the treaty will affect the overall enforcement of the
treaty.235 We have in the past been a leader on enforcing interna-
tional treaties making sure that violators are caught and pun-
ished.236 Thus, the United States, as a world superpower, should
seize this opportunity to lead the world on the land mine problem
that needlessly plagues so many countries worldwide.237
E. Land Mines as a Military Necessity
On July 19, 1997, the anti-mine coalition released excerpts
from a fifteen volume 1972 Army report in an attempt to persuade
President Clinton to sign-on to the Ottawa Process. 238 These
excerpts revealed provocative results from the United States
military use of mines during the Korea and Vietnam conflicts. 239
The statistics released tend to undermine the Pentagon's insistence
that mines are a military necessity.240
The Pentagon contends that this report "went back and it
looked at events that happened thirty years ago., 241 Authorities
insist that the United States has moved away from deploying land
231. Id.
232. Fransden, supra note 154.
233. See id.
234. Letter from Donald S. Gann, et al., American Friends Service Committee,
to President Clinton (Sept. 18, 1997) (reprinted in 143 CONG. REC. S9781).
235. Leahy, supra note 176, at S9778.
236. Id.
237. See id. at S9780 (emphasizing that what the United States actually did in
Oslo was to say that we are the most powerful Nation on the earth, but we will
not give up our anti-personnel mines).
238. Kreisher, supra note 187, at A-10; see also Fransden, supra note 152. The
report is entitled, "In Its Own Words: The U.S. Army and Antipersonnel Mines
in the Korea and Vietnam Wars." Id.
239. See Kreisher, supra note 187, at A-10.
240. See Fransden, supra note 152.
241. Kreisher, supra note 187, at A-10.
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mines that are a threat to its own soldiers.242 Now, the military
is using "smart" mines that deactivate or destroy themselves after
being activated.243 Thus, the hazards our mines created in the
past for our soldiers no longer remain a problem, according to the
Pentagon.2"
The excerpts from the 1972 Army report reveal statistics that
are startling and demonstrate that our mine use in Korea and
Vietnam was not very successful.245 In both conflicts, thousands
of American soldiers were killed by United States mines.2' In
fact, about one-third of all United States casualties in Vietnam
were caused by mines or booby traps, and ninety percent of these
mines had American components. 24 7 Also, in Vietnam the North
Vietnamese routinely raided United States minefields and in one
instance the Viet Cong lifted 10,000 U.S.-made M-16 mines.
2
"
Those who oppose the deployment of anti-personnel mines
argue against their necessity in the defense of our troops. 249 The
mines are likely to inflict a "blow-back" effect harming our own
soldiers." Thus, they argue that because these mines serve no
real useful military advantage, the United States should sign the
Oslo Treaty and support a Treaty that would protect innocent
civilians worldwide5 1
F Final Analysis
When a Treaty was drafted and agreed upon by close to one-
hundred nations on September 18, 1997, in Oslo, Norway, President
Clinton was faced with a difficult task of deciding if the United
States should sign this Treaty.2 2 On one side, President Clinton
was bombarded with arguments by the Pentagon attempting to
persuade him not to sign the Treaty, thus leaving anti-personnel
242. Id.
243. See id.
244. See Fransden, supra note 152.
245. See id.
246. See id. Frank Gaffney, a former Reagan administration defense official
who founded the Center for Security Policy, clearly admits that Americans have
been killed in past conflicts by American-made land mines, but still contends a ban
would result in more casualties. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Isenburg, supra note 197, at 19.
250. Id.
251. See, e.g., id.
252. See In Questionable Company, supra note 113, at B8.
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land mines intact in the United States arsenal.253 On the other
side was President Clinton's own promise that he would back land
mine reform and possibly the fate of those less powerful nations
that have to face the land mine crisis.254 Ultimately, President
Clinton made this difficult decision and sided with his military
advisors agreeing not to sign the Oslo Treaty.255
The President may have been able to avoid the United States'
current predicament by signing onto the Ottawa Process sooner.
Unfortunately, the President had been lagging behind on this issue
from the start.256 When the President finally did send negotiators
to Oslo, it proved much too late. 7 When the negotiators arrived
in Oslo, they were.saddled by demands that had little chances of
success and very little flexibility with which to negotiate.258 It was
this lack of a good faith effort from the start that ultimately ended
with the United States on the sidelines while the rest of the world
agreed to ban-all anti-personnel land mines.
1. The Main Issues-The President, in his news conference
on his decision not to sign the Treaty, focused on both the anti-
tank issue and the Korean Peninsula issue.259  Thus, it appears
that these were the main roadblocks that kept the United States
from signing the Treaty.
a. Korean Peninsula Issue-It is admirable that the President
is not willing to sign a Treaty that could endanger the 37,000
United States troops that are serving overseas. 26 After all, he is
the commander-in-chief of our military. However, if the President
is sincere about developing alternative defense mechanisms for the
Korean Peninsula by 2006,261 then this issue may not have been
part of the deal-breaker in Oslo. The Oslo Treaty effectively
grants a ten year grace period for removing existing minefields. 262
253. Sanity Prevails on Land Mines, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1997, at A20.
254. See, e.g., In Questionable Company, supra note 113, at B8.
255. See Sanity Prevails, supra note 253, at A20 (noting that although President
Clinton has been very fond of multilateral agreements in the past, he listened to
the unanimous chorus of his military advisors).
256. See Leahey, supra note 176, at S9779.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Clinton, supra note 127.
260. Steven Lee Myers, Clinton Says Ban on Mines Would Put U.S. Troops at
Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1997, at A8.
261. See Clinton, supra note 127, at 3.
262. See Convention, supra note 8. Article five entitled "Destruction of Anti
Personnel Mines in Mined Areas" states: "1. Each State Party undertakes to
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Thus, by the year 2006 when, according to the President's directive,
the United States should have developed alternatives to mine use
in Korea, we could remove our anti-personnel land mines on the
Korean Peninsula 263 in full compliance with the provisions of the
Treaty. Therefore, this issue is manageable under the Treaty's
language and should not have been a roadblock to the United
States signature.
b. Anti-Tank Issue-The Pentagon and military advisors have
insisted that our anti-tank mine systems, which include the use of
anti-personnel mines, are a necessity to fighting on the modern day
battlefield. Admittedly, this was a tough issue facing the President.
However, if the President is really sincere in finding alternatives to
all anti-personnel land mine use2' then this issue should not have
been a deal breaker in Oslo either. The President has called for
alternatives to be in place by 2003 for all United States anti-
personnel land mine use."' Thus, in five years we will have an
alternative to our anti-tank systems using anti-personnel mines. So,
how critical does this issue appear? The United States, a very
technologically advanced nation, should be able to devise an
alternative to the use of anti-personnel mines in these systems.
Furthermore, the Oslo Treaty still permits the use of anti-tank
mines, just not with anti-personnel mines. 266
2. A Plea to Sign-We are facing a world-wide land mine
crisis. The statistics that show the yearly fatalities and injuries do
not lie. 67 So, what does one do when faced with such an enor-
mous problem? One takes the initiative and finds a solution.
Close to one-hundred nations have done this, but unfortunately, the
world's most influential nation has not.268 However, it is not too
late.
destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control,
as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of the
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President Clinton should re-think his decision not to sign the
Oslo Treaty. In doing so, he should consider the reality that this
Treaty, without United States support, may become a dismal
failure.269 The United States has been given an incredible oppor-
tunity to lead the rest of the world towards cooperatively solving
one of the world's greatest problems. The United States should
help solve this crisis, not impede the solution. Nothing short of this
should be expected from the world's leading democracy. We
should fully join the Ottawa Process, sign the Oslo Treaty and lead
the rest of the world into a safer twenty-first century.
Craig S. Sharnetzka
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